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China has made remarkable progress in increasing its
income level through industrialization over the past three dec-
ades. It is also well known that, after the onset of reform, real
wage rate for China’s unskilled labor had not risen for more
than two decades, thereby supporting rapid industrialization
(Cai & Du, 2011). However, during the past decade China’s
unskilled wage rate appears to have been rising at an acceler-
ating rate parallel to the GDP growth rate. It is common in the
rural population that workers seek lucrative employment
through migration to urban sectors, and the rising wage rate
continues to encourage the rural–urban migration, which cre-
ates labor shortage in rural sectors. While the rising wage rate
helps to reduce rural poverty, it is also creating an emerging
challenge to agriculture in China, where production largely
depends on small-scale, family-based and labor-intensive oper-
ations. In this paper, we examine (i) whether the use of machi-
nes (mainly through machine rental and services) substitutes
for labor despite the prevalence of small-scale farming and
land fragmentation and (ii) how the increase in real wages
has induced a realization of scale economies through the use
of agricultural machine and land rental markets under the
institutional constraint of a prohibition on sale of agricultural
land in China.
Family labor tends to be more intensively used on smaller
farms in the absence of eﬃcient labor markets due to diﬃculty
in monitoring and supervising hire labor, which, in turn con-
tributes to the inverse relationship between farm size and crop
yield (Benjamin & Brandt, 2002; Berry & Cline, 1979; Chen,
Huﬀman, & Rozelle, 2009; Feder, 1985). Chinese agriculture,
dominated by labor-intensive small farms, mainly rely on fam-
ily labor (Cook, 1999). 1However, such an inverse relationship
could be changed when the economy grows fast, accompany-
ing a rising real wage rate and thus making labor-intensive
production expensive. The wage growth may have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the eﬃciency of small-scale farming in Asia and30potentially more generally in land-scarce developing countries
(Otsuka, Liu, & Yamauchi, 2013).
The following intuition shapes up the key hypotheses of this
paper. An increase in real wages increases the production cost
of labor-intensive farming system and thereby decreases com-
parative advantage in agriculture based on the labor-intensive
production methods widely observed in many parts of Asia.
To reduce the production cost, at least partially, farm size
expansion helps mechanization to take place and therefore
to substantially save high-cost labor, given that large machines
are by nature indivisible. However, the introduction of mech-
anization would be diﬃcult if farm size expansion is con-
strained by high transaction costs of land consolidation due
to land fragmentation and/or imperfect land rental markets.
China provides an interesting setting, in which selling agricul-
tural land is prohibited and expansion of operational farm
area can only be achieved through land rental markets. The
prohibition on land sales creates an ideal experimental ground
to assess how land rental markets respond to rising real
wages. 2
The key idea of this paper is related to the induced innova-
tions proposed by Hicks (1932), and later elaborated by
Hayami and Ruttan (1985) who introduced the idea ofrevision accepted: May 5, 2016.
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real wages may induce a technical change to save labor or,
simply, a substitution between labor and machines, i.e., mech-
anization, but also could lead to a new institutional arrange-
ment that saves labor and/or reduces user costs of machines
on farm even without land consolidation. As Otsuka (2013)
elaborates, increasing real wages (and transformation of occu-
pational structures in labor markets) challenge Asian agricul-
ture in which the majority of farmers are smallholders, because
of the increasing need (i) to reduce the labor force in agricul-
ture (as the opportunity cost of labor increases), (ii) to increase
the average farm size (to reduce labor use by introducing
labor-saving production methods) and (iii) to generate enough
income to retain parity with non-agricultural workers. If land
markets and/or institutional mechanisms are imperfect, major
ineﬃciencies in the allocation of farm land will be bound to
arise. Otsuka et al. (2013) present evidence consistent with
the above conjectures using cross-country panel data. Foster
and Rosenzweig (2010, 2011) show some evidence to support
the second point in India. Yamauchi (2016) also shows evi-
dence from Indonesia that relatively large farms gain more
eﬃciency in production by expanding their farm land and
introducing machines. Using commodity-wise province-level
panel data, Wang, Yamauchi, and Huang (2014) showed clear
evidence supporting the capital-labor substitution responding
to changes in the relative price of machines to agricultural
labor in China.
This paper shows evidence from China that largely supports
the proposition that wage growth in recent years led to an
introduction of labor saving practices. The emergence of
machine service rental appears to mitigate the eﬃciency cost
attributed to the land market rigidities in China by mitigating
the indivisibility of machines. That is, prospective farmers tend
to acquire more land by renting in land given the constraint of
land sale market and also rely on machine services, rather than
purchasing machines when real wages increase. This is espe-
cially true for relatively large farms. The empirical ﬁndings
also show that land and machine services are complementary
and its eﬀect is larger and more signiﬁcant among relatively
large landholders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes wage
growth and mechanization recently observed in Chinese agri-
culture. Section 3 explains the panel data collected in six pro-
vinces in China, with two rounds in 2000 and 2008. Section 4
describes empirical strategy. The empirical ﬁndings are summa-
rized in Section 5, followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.2. WAGE GROWTH AND MECHANIZATION
IN CHINA
China’s economy has maintained its high annual growth
rate of GDP, roughly at 10%, for more than four decades.
In 2013, GDP per capita reached nearly US$6629 (NBSC,
2014). Among other factors, oﬀ-farm employment, especially
through rural to urban labor migration, has played an impor-
tant role in the nation’s structural transformation and has
been a source of economic growth (Cai & Wang, 2010;
Zhang & Song, 2013). The rise of oﬀ farm employment for
the farm population was one of the most salient features of
China’s development during the 1980s and 1990s. According
to the 2000 China National Rural Survey only 15% of the
rural labor force had a job oﬀ farm in the early 1980s. By
2000 the share of the rural labor force that worked oﬀ the farm
reached 45.3% (Wang, Huang, Zhang, & Rozelle, 2011). With
a rural labor force exceeding 500 million, this means that in2000 more than 218 million individuals were working fully
or part time oﬀ the farm (Giles, 2006; NBSC, 2001). The
upward trend in the share of the rural labor force with oﬀ farm
employment continues to rise. From 45.3% in 2000, more than
60% of the rural labor force is working oﬀ the farm in 2011.
When reviewing the process of adopting labor-saving tech-
nology in agriculture, it is generally assumed that this can be
achieved through substituting machine-based engineering
technology for labor. This, in turn, helps to save more labor
time for nonfarm activities, potentially increasing income from
other sources.
Initially, the eﬀort to promote appropriate mechanization
dates back to the stage of collective system before 1978. Even
though large ineﬃciency is attributed to this collective institu-
tion, causing less motivated production and other adverse
social eﬀects, certain remarkable achievements have been
acknowledged (Lin, 1991, 1992). Speciﬁcally, agricultural
machinery stations at diﬀerent administrative levels were
established to provide machine operation services at the ﬁxed
price. Projects were designed to provide machine operations
including plowing, sowing and reaping within villages, or pro-
duction teams who were equipped with large- or medium-sized
machines, especially tractors. This institutional mechanism
also facilitated mutual aid among neighboring farmers to
operate small motorized farming machines in peak seasons.
As a result, mechanical farm operations increased gradually;
about 28% of sown area were mechanically plowed in 1980
(Figure 1, Panel a).
The pattern of mechanical farm operations in Chinese agri-
cultural production changed completely during the early per-
iod of rural reform. During the implementation of
Household Responsibility System, small-sized machines and
draft animals were distributed to households on an egalitarian
basis. However, large- and medium-sized machines such as
riding tractors which used to be shared by a production team
composed of generally 20–30 households or managed by the
committee of village leaders were not amenable to distribution
to individual households. The use of mechanical operations in
plowing declined because households sought to save opera-
tional costs and preferred to use draft animals for timely cul-
tivations (Figure 1). From 1980 to 1983, more than 10 million
ha of sown area were not mechanically plowed any more as it
turned out not to be cost eﬀective. The share of areas under
which sowing and reaping were mechanically operated largely
remained constant at 10% and 4%, respectively. Furthermore,
the small size of cultivated land divided into several frag-
mented plots is another constraint that inhibits mechanical
farm operations (Fleisher & Liu, 1992).
Experience in many developed countries shows that the pro-
cess of mechanization is driven by changes in relative prices,
particularly the rising wage rate of oﬀ-farm labor, and China
is not an exception (Wang et al., 2014). The empirical studies
by Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008), Wang et al. (2011) and Li, Li,
Wu, and Xiong (2012) conﬁrmed that migrant wages increased
rapidly, along with wages available to other types of workers,
since the late 1990s. The cost analysis in agricultural produc-
tion also indicates that the annual growth rate of average
on-farm labor cost (yuan/day, real term) was 8% during
1997–2008, and accelerated to reach more than 10% since
(Figure 2). Under the pressure of rising on-farm labor costs
and its opportunity cost determined by oﬀ farm employment,
the number of days that China’s farmers have devoted to on-
farm work has fallen signiﬁcantly. By the mid-2000s, the aver-
age number of labor days per hectare spent on farm had fallen
to less than half of the level in the 1990s (that is, less than
100 days per hectare) (de Brauw, Huang, Zhang, & Rozelle,
Figure 1. The evolution of mechanical farm operations in China’s agriculture. Source: China Rural Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 2012).
32 WORLD DEVELOPMENT2013). In the past decade, the number of rural residents who
have found oﬀ-farm employment has risen dramatically, and
there has also been a sharp rise in the level of mechanization.
The demand for mechanical farm operations has risen to com-
pensate for the shortage of labor, especially in peak seasons, as
the number of permanent migrants to urban and sub-urban
areas has increased.
We can explore the adoption of mechanical farm operations
from two dimensions: (i) the investment in agricultural machi-
nes by smallholders and (ii) the provision of machine services.
Some earlier studies report positive correlations between
investments in agricultural machines and remittances from
migrants (de Brauw & Rozelle, 2008; Ji, Yu, & Zhong, 2012;
Taylor, Rozelle, & de Brauw, 2003). This suggests that, withthe expansion of oﬀ farm employment opportunities that
increase their incomes, smallholders whose household mem-
bers work outside the village are more likely to substitute
own agricultural machines for labor. Given the average farm
size of 0.6 hectare with fragmented plots and possibly inﬂexi-
ble land rent markets, smallholders prefer to use small machi-
nes, such as less-than-12 horsepower tractors. In contrast to
the US where the average farm size is around 180 hectares,
Chinese smallholders cannot aﬀord to use large machines to
plow, plant, and harvest. It should be also noted that the fre-
quency and scope of land reallocations negatively aﬀects
investments aimed to improve land productivity, because
smallholders are afraid of losing such investments in case that
they are assigned to diﬀerent plots of land in the future
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Figure 2. Trend of average daily wage rate of on-farm labor (yuan/day) in
agricultural production, 1997–2012. Note: Cost is calculated at 2005
constant price. Source: National Compilation of Cost and Revenue in
Agricultural Production (National Development and Reform Commission,
China, 1998–2013).
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(Zhang, Wang, Glauben, & Bru¨mmer, 2011). 3
The proportion of farmers investing in machines is low,
which is partially explained by the availability of machine ser-
vices across China, which in eﬀect makes mechanical farm
operations available to farmers without the indivisibility of
exclusive reliance on owned machines. Even though land frag-
mentation still inhibits adoption of machines, Chinese small-
holders have rapidly adopted machine rental services in
many plain areas of China. The mechanization service by
and large evolved spontaneously in response to emerging
needs to substitute labor by capital (Liu & Wang, 2005).
Generally, two forms of mechanization are witnessed in the
ﬁeld. One is mechanical services provided by Specialized Cus-
tom Plowers, Planters and Harvesters (SCPPH) teams, who
own large machines (Yang, Huang, Zhang, & Reardon,
2013). The other is machine rental markets, from which house-
holds can rent machines to operate on their farms. There has
been a rapid rise in SCPPH teams’ activities. These teams are
all private. They own machines and many of them are special-
ized in this activity; some do not even have their own contract
land or have rented out their own contract land. Most typi-
cally, SCPPH teams are made up of two to three family mem-
bers. Because agricultural production is still managed by
smallholders, these teams generally set up an agreement orally
or in writing on conditions such as price and time with all the
households who cultivate one or several plots of land. They
will provide mechanical operation services from plowing to
harvesting to smallholders. The smallholders will come to
the ﬁeld to supervise the process of mechanical operations
and to pay the machine service provider. 4 Usually there is a
‘‘well-established price” for the services (that is, a kind of mar-
ket price).
Mechanical operation teams have extended their activities
beyond simply providing mechanical operation services.
For example, in northeast China, these teams have started
to rent in and consolidate land from smallholders to realize
scale economies. Then they organize agricultural production
with mechanical operations within the team and hire laborers
as well. These teams typically also provide mechanical oper-
ation services to their neighboring farmers. They can use
large-size machines on the consolidated land and upgrade
their machines with subsidies provided from the government.
However, they also face some constraints on keeping or
expanding the consolidated land. First, the land rent-in con-
tracts are mainly short term, often subject to renewal everyyear. The farmers who rent out their land expect that the
rent will increase and thus hesitate to sign long-term con-
tracts. The insecurity involved with using consolidated land
(and, more generally, any short-term rental arrangements)
make the operators less likely to invest in the land. Secondly,
even though they would like to upgrade their machines, they
may not able to obtain the quota to buy the subsidized large-
size machines. 5
Because of a move to oﬀ-farm employment, especially
through migration, Chinese smallholders began to adopt
mechanical farm operations to substitute for labor in produc-
tion since the 1990s (Figure 1). The rapid expansion of
mechanical operations occurred in plowing, sowing, and har-
vesting. Mechanically plowed areas doubled with an annual
growth rate of more than 3% during 1983–2006 (Figure 1,
Panel a). 6 The growth of mechanically plowed areas acceler-
ated to over 5% per year from 2008 to 2011. More than 72%
of cultivated areas are now mechanically plowed. Mechanical
sowing areas also doubled during the 1990s, but mechanically
harvested areas increased only around 1.5 times (Figure 1,
Panels b and c). Furthermore, mechanical sowing and reaping
have started to accelerate since 2003 with annual growth rates
of 4.5% and 7%, respectively. By 2011, more than 40% of cul-
tivated areas are mechanically sown or reaped.3. DATA
(a) Household survey
We use farm survey data that was collected in two rounds to
represent the whole country. The Center for Chinese Agricul-
tural Policy carried out the surveys in December 2000 (collect-
ing data for the year 2000) and early 2009 (collecting data for
the year 2008). The dataset for 2000 includes information from
60 randomly selected villages in six provinces representing
China’s major agricultural regions. The selected provinces
are Hebei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Sichuan and Hubei.
A total of 1,200 households were sampled in the following
way. For each province, ﬁve counties were selected. Then
two villages were randomly selected from each county. Twenty
farm households were chosen from each village. We judged
that the data of 1,189 households out of the 1,200 initial sam-
ple households were complete. In the 2009 survey, we went
back to the same villages that were surveyed in 2000. There
were two exceptions. Because of the 2008 earthquake in
Sichuan, we were not able to repeat the survey in two of the
villages. As a consequence, the sample size (including those
without complete records in 2001) was reduced from 1,200
to 1,160. Among the remaining 1,160 households surveyed
in 2000, we were able to re-investigate 1,046 households in
2009. Of the 114 households that we could not ﬁnd in the vil-
lage, 89 had moved out of the village and were reported to be
living in an urban area. The other 25 households either disap-
peared or were living in the village but were not engaged in
farming activities (18 households—mostly because they were
too sick to farm).
With special attention to crop production for this study, we
constructed a panel dataset of households who were engaged
in crop production. In the year 2000, among 1,194 sample
households, around 90% of households (1,071 households)
were engaged in crop production. Some households exited
from crop production to allow more oﬀ-farm employment
(Kimhi, 2000; Weiss, 1997). In the end, we use the panel data-
set on crop production consisting of 905 households in the
study. 7
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34 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(b) Agricultural production, landholding and machines
In this study, each household’s land endowment is captured
by farm size and the number of plots. Farm size is measured as
self-cultivated land, which is further decomposed into own
land and net rent-in land. The net rent-in land is measured
as land rented in either from the village or land rented in from
other farmers minus land rented out.
In this study, the average self-cultivated land was 6.38 mu
(0.42 ha) and 6.42 mu (0.43 ha) in 2000 and 2008 respectively,
which was about 60% of farm size observed in 1985 (Table 1).
Interestingly, the average size has been nearly constant from
2000 to 2008, the standard deviation has increased, which sug-
gests that some farmers expanded their farm size. Our descrip-
tive analysis shows that farm size was heterogeneous across
provinces. In Hebei and Liaoning provinces, it was a bit larger
than 1.5 times of the average size. On average, the number of
plots was 4.61 and 4.09 in 2000 and 2008, respectively. Our
data also showed a reduction of the number of plots in the
sample provinces, except Hubei.
The kernel density estimation of own land indicates that
own land area did not change much during 2000–08 (Figure 3).
This is consistent with the expectation that China has codiﬁed
a robust framework for protection of land rights. Enlarging
farm size could be achieved through more active utilization
of land rental markets (Gao, Huang, & Rozelle, 2012). The
distributions of net rent-in land show that average rent-in land
increased during 2000–08. Figure 4 shows the relationship
between rented in land and real non-agricultural wage growth
(described below) in 2000 and 2008. The average size of land
rented in has increased from 2000 to 2008. Besides, a positive
relationship between rented in land and real non-agricultural
wage growth is more visible in 2008 than 2000, which is con-
sistent with our proposition.
Interestingly, we also observe that the area of land rented in
has increased in the areas where non-agricultural wages are
stagnant, which creates an u-shape curve. Migration from
stagnant areas could be large as they head to high-growth
areas in distance too, which may induce some farmers to rent
in (as well as rent out) farmland.
The average number of plots ranged between 4 and 5.5
across provinces in 2000. Combined with our observations
on farm size, this suggests that China’s agricultural production
was facing the double pressures of small farm size and frag-
mentations. In the analysis, we include the number of plots
in 2000 (and its squared term) as control variables.Table 1. Descriptive statistics of self-cultivated lan
Provinces Self-cultivated land (mu)
2000 2
All provinces 6.38 6
(6.01) (1
Hebei 10.82 1
(9.03) (1
Shaanxi 5.63 4
(2.94) (3
Liaoning 9.97 1
(7.06) (2
Zhejiang 3.39 3
(2.19) (8
Sichuan 3.65 2
(1.96) (2
Hubei 4.31 4
(3.27) (5
Source: Authors’ own survey.The quantities of both machine investment and demand for
machine services are measured as purchases of machines and
payments for machine services both in yuan at 2000 constant
prices, respectively (Figure 5). Given their small farm size, it is
not a surprise that smallholders are less likely to invest in
machines. Among 905 rural households in the sample, aboutd and no. of plots by province, 2000 and 2008
Number of plots (no.)
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200 yuan (24 US$) in machines. These investments are typi-
cally in small tools such as pesticide sprayers, etc. The cen-
sored distribution of machine investments motivates us to
use the Tobit model in Section 4.
The increased use of machine services could be found from
the increased percentage of rural households who spent more
on machine services (Figure 5). The percentage of ruralhouseholds who rely on mechanical farm operation services
increased from 49% in 2000 to 58% in 2008, with the average
growth rate of 2%. Without adjusting for the price of machine
services (yuan/mu), we found that the average expense
increased from 217 yuan (26 US$) to 285 yuan (34 US$). This
result is consistent with the national-level statistics that show
the expansion of mechanical farm operations in plowing,
planting, and harvesting.
(c) Labor markets and wages
In this study, the key variables of labor supply and wage
rates (agriculture and non-agriculture) are calculated at village
level in order to mitigate the household-level endogeneity that
jointly aﬀects labor supply, wages, and productivity. Labor
supply to oﬀ-farm employment is proxied by the proportion
of oﬀ-farm income in total income for the sampled households
in a village. On average, the proportion of oﬀ-farm income
increased by 20.4 percentage point from 55.7% in 2000 to
75.1% in 2008. Furthermore, labor shortage in agriculture,
especially those in peak seasons, could be captured by the
migration rate in a village, which is deﬁned as the proportion
of household members who lived away (migrants) out of total
laborers for all of the sampled households in a village. The
migration rate doubled from 14.22% in 2000 to 28.62% in
2008, reﬂecting the rapid urbanization in China.
Wage rates used in this study are the average agricultural
and non-agricultural wages in a village. The former is calcu-
lated from the cost of hired-in on-farm labor and the number
of working days (yuan/day) for all of hired on-farm laborers
in a village. 8 The latter is the average wage for all oﬀ-farm
workers in a village (yuan/hour), which is expected to reﬂect
the opportunity cost of farm work in the local economy. Note
that workers can ﬁnd oﬀ-farm jobs not only in their village but
also in the local towns and cities outside the village. Here, all
of the value terms are adjusted at 2000 constant price using
provincial CPIs.
Our analysis shows that the average real agricultural wage
increased from 26.54 yuan/day (3.20 US$/day) in 2000 to
35.09 yuan/day (4.22 US$/day) in 2008 with an average
annual growth rate of 3.5%. The kernel density of agricultural
wage rates indicates that the average agricultural wage
increased as its distribution moved from left to right during
the period but quite mildly (Figure 6a). Non-agricultural
wages increased signiﬁcantly from 2000 to 2008 at diﬀerent
growth rates (Figure 6b). Our data show that hourly non-
agricultural wages doubled from 1.92 yuan/h (0.23 US$/h) in
2000 to 4.00 yuan/h (0.48 US$/h) in 2008. This also suggests
that, similar to those of agricultural wages, non-agricultural
wages also present regional variations in 2000 and 2008.
Figure 7 plots village-level averages of migration rate and
non-agricultural real wage rates in 2000 and 2008 (using
provincial CPIs as deﬂators). Consistent with the Figure 6b,
it is clear that non-agricultural wages increased from 2000 to
2008. Migration rates also increased accordingly and are more
responsible to non-agricultural wages in 2008 than 2000.
Labor outmigration seems to be positively correlated with
an increase in non-agricultural wages.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This section describes the speciﬁcation and estimation strat-
egy used, and discusses identiﬁcation issues. The analysis uses
household-level panel data to examine land transactions,
machine services, and crop incomes. In the analysis of land
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Figure 6a. Kernel densities of real agricultural wage (yuan/day) in 2000
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36 WORLD DEVELOPMENTtransactions and demand for machine services, we investigate
the eﬀects of wage growth, both agricultural and non-
agricultural, which potentially depends on the initial condi-
tions such as landholding and human capital. Human capital,here represented by the average years of schooling completed
in the household, determine non-agricultural labor market
opportunities when wages increase. In contrast, the availabil-
ity of relatively large farm land determines their comparative
advantage in agriculture.
In all the econometric estimations, ﬁrst diﬀerences are taken
to wipe out unobserved ﬁxed error components, which could
lead to bias in the cross-sectional estimation. The key explana-
tory variable in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced form is village-level real
wage growth separately computed for agriculture and
non-agriculture work (as described in Section 3(c)). Labor
can be imperfectly substitutable between agricultural and
non-agricultural work due to diﬀerences in the required skills,
and so we use the village-level wages for the two sectors.
Furthermore, we use the proportion of non-agricultural
income and migration rate, both computed at the village level,
to represent labor shortage in agriculture. Finally, the analysis
of crop income aims to investigate potential complementarities
between machine services and land—either own or rent-in.
In the analysis of land transactions and machine investment
and services, the following ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation is esti-
mated,
Dyijð0;1Þ ¼ aþ b1Dwjð0;1Þ þ b21Dwjð0;1Þlandij0
þ b22Dwjð0;1Þeduij0 þ x0ij0dþ provij þ Deijð0;1Þ ð1Þ
where Dyijð0;1Þ is change in self-cultivated land or net rent-in
land, 9 or change in machine services purchased for household
i in village j, during the period during 2000–08, Dwjð0;1Þ is the
village-level real wage growth rate (agricultural and non-
agricultural wages, treated separately), landij0 is the own-
land or self-cultivated land size in 2000, eduij0 is the average
years of schooling in 2000, xij0 is a vector of initial household
characteristics, provij is a province dummy, and Deijð0;1Þ is the
diﬀerence in shocks (assume that eijt is an ex-post shock after
household decisions are made). Note that b1 shows the eﬀect
of change in the village-level real wage rate on the dependent
variable, and b2 captures how the initial household character-
istics aﬀect the impact of change in the village-level real wage
rate. In Eqn. (1) village-level real wage growth rate is inter-
acted with the initial own or self-cultivated land size and the
average years of schooling. In the estimation, we also include
as Dwjð0;1Þ changes in the proportion of non-agricultural
income and migration rate, both calculated at the village level.
We hypothesize that b21 > 0 and b22 < 0:. That is, facing ris-
ing real wages, relatively large holders tend to increase their
operational size and invest in machines or increase their
demand for machine services. On the other hand, relatively
educated farmers who have better employment opportunities
outside agriculture tend to reduce their operational size and,
therefore, are reluctant to use machines.
We also estimate the crop income equation in the ﬁrst diﬀer-
enced form:
D ln pijð0;1Þ ¼ a0 þ c1Dlandjð0;1Þ þ c2Dmachij0
þ c3Dlandjð0;1ÞDmachjð0;1Þ þ villageij þ Dgijð0;1Þ ð2Þ
where D ln pijð0;1Þ is the crop income growth (that is, the
diﬀerence in log of crop income, Dlandjð0;1Þ is change in the
self-cultivated land, Dmachij0 is change in machine services
purchased, villageij is village ﬁxed eﬀects, and Dgijð0;1Þ is the
diﬀerence in ex-post shocks. The variable Dlandjð0;1Þ can be
decomposed into changes in own land and net rent-in land.
Note that log transformation, once combined with location
(village) dummies, purges common-unit eﬀects such as price
and location-speciﬁc shocks. Therefore, village-level common
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The estimation uses instruments to remove potential bias
due to the correlations between initial period shock and
changes in land and machine inputs. 10 Since village ﬁxed
eﬀects are included, the inference is based on intra-village vari-
ations. Drawing upon the results in Eqn. (1), the instruments
are the interaction terms of (i) village-level non-agricultural
real wage growth, agricultural real wage growth, change in
non-agricultural incomes, and migration rate, (ii) the initial
own land size and the average years of schooling, and (iii) pro-
vince dummies. The interaction of (i) and (ii) creates
household-level variations. Heterogeneity in their eﬀects is
introduced across provinces by interacting them with (iii) pro-
vince dummies. Since we control village ﬁxed eﬀects, the vil-
lage level variables themselves are not included in the
instruments.
Our interest is in c3 measuring the complementarity between
land and machines. In the context of China where the transferTable 2. Determinants of cha
Dependent variable: Change in self-cultivated land (mu)
Real wage growth: Non ag
Real wage growth: Non ag * Land owned (2000)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Real wage growth: Ag
Real wage growth: Ag * Land owned (2000)
Real wage growth: Ag * Years of schooling (labors, 2000)
Change in the proportion of non agri income
Change in the proportion of non agri. income * Land owned (2000)
Change in the proportion of non agri. income * Years of schooling (labors
Change in migration rate
Change in migration rate * Land owned (2000)
Change in migration rate * Years of schooling (labors, 2000)
No. of plots (2000)
No. of plots2 (2000)
Land owned (2000)
Number of labors (2000)
Female (labor, 2000)
Age (labor, 2000)
Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Net crop income (yuan, 2000)
Province dummies
N
R2
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.of land ownership is prohibited, we are particularly interested
in the role of land rental arrangements in expanding (or reduc-
ing) the size of self-cultivated land and realizing scale econo-
mies by augmenting the marginal value of machines. That is,
we hypothesize that c3 > 0.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section reports our empirical results. The ﬁrst set of
estimation results focuses on land transactions, machine
investments, and machine services demanded. We use ﬁrst dif-
ferencing in all estimations. The next set comes from crop
income equations. Instruments are used to endogenize changes
in land cultivated and rented in as well as machine investments
and services demanded in ﬁrst diﬀerenced form.
Table 2 summarizes our results on changes in self-cultivated
farm land. 11 The explanatory variables include non-nge in self-cultivated land
1.1010* 1.0826* 1.2566* 1.2586*
(2.48) (2.43) (2.30) (2.24)
0.0020 0.0062 0.0879 0.0908
(0.04) (0.12) (1.23) (1.29)
0.1625 0.1712 0.2661* 0.2730*
(1.31) (1.36) (2.24) (2.29)
0.7126 0.6743 1.2256 1.1759
(1.25) (1.17) (1.54) (1.41)
0.0399 0.0391 0.0351 0.0360
(1.15) (1.13) (0.83) (0.86)
0.0970 0.0882 0.1573 0.1487
(1.04) (0.92) (1.33) (1.22)
3.3211** 3.2183**
(3.68) (3.78)
0.3048 0.3055
(1.40) (1.38)
, 2000) 0.5190** 0.5230**
(3.59) (3.78)
2.2392* 1.8656*
(2.18) (2.25)
0.5273 0.4724
(0.94) (0.85)
0.3693 0.3760
(0.95) (1.00)
0.0248 0.5575* 0.0624 0.5489**
(0.16) (2.53) (0.42) (2.60)
0.0518** 0.0474**
(3.53) (3.42)
0.1667 0.1694 0.3923* 0.3839*
(1.41) (1.44) (2.24) (2.19)
0.3893 0.3702 0.3551 0.3373
(1.67) (1.64) (1.54) (1.50)
0.0954 0.0855 0.1375 0.1299
(0.34) (0.31) (0.51) (0.48)
0.0649** 0.0653** 0.0585** 0.0591**
(2.83) (2.93) (2.77) (2.88)
0.0600 0.0549 0.2151 0.2095
(0.70) (0.62) (1.72) (1.69)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.14) (0.20) (1.25) (1.16)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
905 905 905 905
0.081 0.084 0.100 0.103
38 WORLD DEVELOPMENTagricultural real wage growth, agricultural real wage growth,
change in the proportion of non-agricultural income, and
the migration rate, all of which were computed at the village
level. The village-level changes are interacted with the house-
hold’s land owned in 2000 and the average years of schooling
completed (as of 2000). These interaction terms are intended
to capture the degree to which the initial levels of household
land and human capital endowment diﬀerentiate the eﬀects
of the village-level changes. In addition, the speciﬁcations
include, as controls, the number of plots, its squared term,
land owned, the number of laborers, that of family laborers,
the average age, and years of schooling completed. Province
dummies are also included to control for the province-level
average changes.
Columns 1 and 2 include non-agricultural and agricultural
real wage growth, both of which are interacted with the initial
size of land owned and the average years of schooling
completed. Column 1 has the number of plots, while Column
2 adds its squared term. The results show that non-agriculturalTable 3. Determinants of ch
Dependent variable: Change in net rent-in land (mu)
Real wage growth: Non ag
Real wage growth: Non ag * Land owned (2000)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Real wage growth: Ag
Real wage growth: Ag * Land owned (2000)
Real wage growth: Ag * Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Change in the proportion of non agri income
Change in the proportion of non agri. income * Land owned (2000)
Change in the proportion of non agri. income * Years of schooling (labors
Change in migration rate
Change in migration rate * Land owned (2000)
Change in migration rate * Years of schooling (labors, 2000)
No. of plot (2000)
No. of plot2 (2000)
Land owned (2000)
Number of labors (2000)
Female (labor, 2000)
Age (labor, 2000)
Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Net crop income (yuan, 2000)
Province dummies
N
R2
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.real wage growth has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on
change in self-cultivated land, implying that cultivated land
area has increased signiﬁcantly in villages that experienced
an increase in real wage in non-agricultural sectors. In con-
trast, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of agricultural real wage
growth.
Columns 3 and 4 also add changes in non-agricultural
income and migration rate (both computed at the village
level), interacted with the initial size of land owned and the
average years of schooling completed. First, the eﬀects of
non-agricultural real wage growth remain robust. Second,
change in the proportion of non-agricultural income also has
a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on change in self-cultivated
land. Third, their interactions with the average years of
schooling has signiﬁcant and negative eﬀects, which implies
that, in response to employment opportunities in non-
agricultural sectors, farm households endowed with more
human capital (measured in educational attainment) tend to
reduce the size of farm operations by renting out land. Finally,ange in net rent-in land
0.7814** 0.7656** 0.7950* 0.7969*
(2.61) (2.85) (2.08) (2.11)
0.0069 0.0139 0.0271 0.0298
(0.25) (0.50) (0.51) (0.57)
0.1097* 0.1172* 0.1259*** 0.1322****
(2.20) (2.44) (4.13) (4.46)
0.7135 0.7463 0.6941 0.7396
(1.81) (1.95) (1.06) (1.18)
0.0123 0.0130 0.0177 0.0169
(0.45) (0.47) (0.31) (0.30)
0.0622 0.0698 0.0573 0.0652
(1.36) (1.60) (0.97) (1.17)
0.1049 0.0107
(0.07) (0.01)
0.0686 0.0692
(0.53) (0.55)
, 2000) 0.0740 0.0777
(0.36) (0.39)
1.8823 1.5403
(0.72) (0.71)
0.1955 0.1452
(0.33) (0.24)
0.0599 0.0660
(0.12) (0.13)
0.0590 0.5149*** 0.0530 0.4984***
(0.70) (6.72) (0.59) (6.97)
0.0444**** 0.0433***
(5.38) (4.86)
0.0095 0.0072 0.0498 0.0421
(0.13) (0.10) (0.41) (0.35)
0.0110 0.0053 0.0137 0.0026
(0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02)
0.1196 0.1111 0.1194 0.1124
(0.55) (0.52) (0.54) (0.51)
0.0063 0.0067 0.0056 0.0062
(0.58) (0.61) (0.51) (0.55)
0.1144* 0.1101* 0.1331** 0.1280**
(2.49) (2.37) (2.88) (2.96)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.57) (0.62) (0.54) (0.61)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
905 905 905 905
0.034 0.039 0.035 0.040
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pret here but this could be because large migration out of the
village could shrink agricultural activities. 12
Table 3 reports the estimation results on change in net rent-
in land. The net rent-in land is land rented in minus that
rented out. Consistent with the previous ﬁndings, non-
agricultural real wage growth has a signiﬁcant and positive
eﬀect on change in net rent-in land. Its interaction term with
the average years of schooling is also negative and signiﬁcant.
Farmers tend to rent in land when the non-agricultural wage
increases, but rent out land if the households have more edu-
cated members. Other variables of interest are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Next we analyze machine investments and service demands.
Table 4 shows the results on machine investments. The aggre-
gate value of investments in agricultural machines in 2000–08
was computed. The estimation uses the same speciﬁcations asTable 4. Determinants of
Dependent variable: Machine investment (yuan)
Real wage growth: Non ag
Real wage growth: Non ag * Self-cultivated land (2000)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Real wage growth: Ag
Real wage growth: Ag * Self-cultivated land (2000)
Real wage growth: Ag * Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Change in the proportion of non agri income
Change in the proportion of non agri income * Self-cultivated land (2000)
Change in the proportion of non agri income * Years of schooling (labor,
Change in migration rate
Change in migration rate * Self-cultivated land (2000)
Change in migration rate * Years of schooling (labors, 2000)
No. of plot (2000)
No. of plot2 (2000)
Land owned (2000)
Number of labors (2000)
Female (labor, 2000)
Age (labor, 2000)
Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Net crop income (yuan, 2000)
Province dummies
Sigma
N
Log likelihood
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.in Tables 2 and 3, but we use the Tobit model for machine
investments because the dependent variable is censored at zero
(nearly a half of observations have no investment). Only the
interaction of agricultural real wage growth with the initial
size of self-cultivated land (Columns 1 and 2) and the initial
size of land owned (all columns) are signiﬁcant. We may con-
clude that machine investments are explained primarily by the
initial cultivation size and growth of agricultural wages, but
not by changes in non-agricultural employment opportunities
in the current empirical context.
Table 5 shows the results on machine services demanded.
First, similar to the results on machine investments, an increase
in agricultural real wage raises the value of machine services
demanded if the size of self-cultivated land is relatively large.
Second, an increase in migration rate also raises the demand
for machine services when self-cultivated land is relatively large
at the initial stage. Both results imply that the demand formachine investments
1,646.2786 1,604.7218 2,498.9604 2,462.9412
(0.72) (0.70) (1.07) (1.05)
38.6778 25.6026 52.0189 42.0548
(0.89) (0.71) (1.10) (0.99)
50.3236 63.5197 164.6159 177.0121
(0.21) (0.25) (0.80) (0.82)
322.4894 400.0418 233.1681 135.0249
(0.28) (0.35) (0.25) (0.15)
96.9997*** 97.2777*** 33.8736 32.3809
(2.63) (2.71) (0.75) (0.68)
94.6228 114.6717 55.6599 76.0612
(0.58) (0.72) (0.36) (0.52)
3,006.4947 2,808.0877
(0.70) (0.68)
380.4257 385.2402
(1.42) (1.47)
2000) 774.7139 774.1202
(1.39) (1.40)
6,155.0801 5,382.7883
(0.50) (0.45)
752.7662 841.7403
(1.39) (1.59)
1,038.3203 1,028.3972
(0.87) (0.87)
227.4205 1,164.7252 167.9951 1,131.2169*
(1.23) (1.63) (1.08) (1.78)
89.5733 92.2336*
(1.61) (1.77)
137.4507*** 133.7114** 160.692*** 168.4947***
(2.66) (2.37) (3.03) (3.08)
48.2392 82.1584 76.5001 111.8911
(0.34) (0.60) (0.51) (0.80)
480.7778 465.4561 520.3242 506.8017
(1.22) (1.20) (1.33) (1.32)
65.1338 67.0338 63.4615 65.6581
(1.56) (1.62) (1.51) (1.57)
41.2211 27.5204 142.4075 128.7741
(0.22) (0.14) (0.56) (0.52)
0.0720*** 0.0741** 0.0855** 0.0892**
(2.05) (2.07) (2.10) (2.13)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
6,913.90*** 6,887.91*** 6,895.43*** 6,868.54***
(4.49) (4.54) (4.55) (4.59)
905 905 905 905
5,007.524 5,005.2744 5,004.2946 5,001.9182
Table 5. Determinants of change in machine services
Dependent variable: Change in machine service (yuan)
Real wage growth: Non ag 17.6465 18.2858 26.9568 27.1143
(0.36) (0.38) (0.48) (0.49)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Self-cultivated land (2000) 0.7045 0.9709 1.4316 1.5845
(0.25) (0.33) (0.55) (0.59)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Years of schooling (labor, 2000) 2.0099 1.6874 1.1506 0.8777
(0.29) (0.25) (0.17) (0.13)
Real wage growth: Ag 35.8991 37.2477 8.0805 6.0585
(0.80) (0.84) (0.17) (0.13)
Real wage growth: Ag * Self-cultivated land (2000) 3.3223* 3.3254* 7.8305** 7.8239**
(2.23) (2.22) (3.96) (3.84)
Real wage growth: Ag *Years of schooling (labors, 2000) 6.4560 6.8117 4.7465 5.0752
(1.22) (1.31) (0.97) (1.04)
Change in the proportion of non agri income 20.6135 23.2196
(0.30) (0.33)
Change in the proportion of non agri income * Self-cultivated land (2000) 24.9465 24.7373
(1.97) (1.94)
Change in the proportion of non agri income * Years of schooling (labors, 2000) 8.1823 8.0409
(1.35) (1.33)
Change in migration rate 38.3717 49.3338
(0.36) (0.45)
Change in migration rate * Self-cultivated land (2000) 49.9934** 51.2942**
(2.78) (2.92)
10.8734 11.0892
(0.89) (0.84)
No. of plot 2.0780 18.0790 3.2762 14.2783
(0.27) (0.94) (0.41) (0.86)
No. of plot2 1.9580 1.7077
(1.30) (1.29)
Land owned (2000) 6.9892 7.0269 7.2108 6.9851
(1.02) (1.02) (1.60) (1.55)
Number of labors (2000) 9.9131 10.6000* 12.1565* 12.7658*
(1.78) (2.08) (2.08) (2.36)
Female (labor, 2000) 6.7640 7.1242 5.7277 6.0187
(0.71) (0.73) (0.55) (0.57)
Age (labor, 2000) 0.9446 0.9274 1.1726 1.1523
(0.89) (0.89) (1.08) (1.07)
Years of schooling (labor, 2000) 0.0185 0.2166 2.5423 2.7222
(0.00) (0.06) (0.45) (0.46)
Net crop income (yuan, 2000) 0.0018 0.0018 0.0014 0.0015
(1.15) (1.18) (0.82) (0.86)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 905 905 905 905
R2 0.084 0.086 0.103 0.105
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
40 WORLD DEVELOPMENTmachine services increases as it becomes more diﬃcult and/or
expensive to secure labor for agricultural operations.
Next we check robustness of our results using village ﬁxed
eﬀects. Table 6 shows village ﬁxed eﬀects estimation results
on changes in self-cultivated land, net rent-in land and
machine services. The results on machine investments were
omitted as the results were insigniﬁcant as previously shown
in Table 4. The speciﬁcations do not include linear terms of
wage growth (both agricultural and non-agricultural) and
changes in the proportion of non-agricultural income and
migration rate, all calculated at the village level, since their
eﬀects were controlled by village ﬁxed eﬀects. These are consis-
tent with our previous ﬁndings that in the self-cultivated land
equations (Columns 1 and 2), the education eﬀects were signif-
icantly negative with non-agricultural wage growth and
change of the non-agricultural income proportion. Similarly,
the initial land eﬀect is signiﬁcantly positive with agricultural
wage growth in the net rent-in equation (Column 3) and themachine service equation (Column 5). Though signiﬁcance
level varies across equations, the heterogeneous eﬀects by the
initial landholding and educational attainment remain robust,
consistent with the results obtained with province dummies.
Table 9 checks the education eﬀect using a sub-sample of
households that had the number of out-migrants in 2008 smal-
ler than or equal to that of 2000. Note that those households
might have changed out-migrants but the number of out-
migrants stayed the same or became smaller in 2008, which
indicates that their net migration after 2000 was zero or nega-
tive. Interestingly, the results remain qualitatively the same in
the self-cultivated land and net rent-in land equations, imply-
ing that even if relatively educated farmers stay farming, they
tend to reduce the operational size in response to rising real
wages.
Overall, the results on land transactions and demands for
machines are consistent. Non-agricultural wage growth and
larger employment opportunities in non-agricultural sectors
Table 7. Crop income
Dependent: Crop income growth (diﬀerence in log) No IV IV No IV IV No IV IV No IV IV
Sample: All All >6 mu >6 mu
Change in land owned 0.1170*** 0.1059*** 0.1408*** 0.1338*** 0.0984*** 0.1143*** 0.1240*** 0.1299***
(9.31) (4.59) (9.65) (4.70) (7.82) (5.20) (8.40) (4.42)
Change in net rent-in land 0.0886*** 0.0933*** 0.0758*** 0.0201 0.0525*** 0.0991*** 0.0192 0.0062
(6.20) (2.98) (4.52) (0.49) (3.69) (3.72) (1.14) (0.17)
Change in mechanic service 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 0.0004
(0.07) (1.14) (0.06) (1.00) (0.64) (0.84) (0.81) (0.70)
Change in machine service * change in land owned 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0000
(2.79) (1.31) (2.10) (0.28)
Change in machine service * change in net rent-in land 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0001** 0.0003***
(0.69) (1.86) (2.47) (3.44)
Village ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 605 605 605 605 239 239 239 239
R2 0.171 0.187 0.255 0.318
Hausman Test of IV: Chi squared 2.36 5.32 8.91 16.86
P-value 0.50 0.38 0.03 0.00
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 6. Robustness check: Village ﬁxed eﬀects
Dependent variable Self-cultivated land
(mu)
Net rent-in land
(mu)
Change in machine
service (yuan)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Land owned (2000) 0.0842 0.0316 0.0675 0.0391 1.3165 1.1815
(0.99) (0.38) (1.06) (0.52) (0.25) (0.24)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Years of schooling (labor, 2000) 0.4138* 0.4595* 0.1721 0.1842 1.5627 2.2943
(1.70) (1.96) (1.37) (1.50) (0.19) (0.27)
Real wage growth: Ag * Land owned (2000) 0.2180 0.1556 0.0613** 0.0670 2.9460* 3.6742
(1.28) (1.03) (2.44) (1.61) (1.83) (1.48)
Real wage growth: Ag * Years of schooling (labors, 2000) 0.0691 0.0694 0.0548 0.0503 0.5937 0.3163
(0.80) (0.73) (0.65) (0.56) (0.13) (0.07)
Change in the proportion of non agri. income * Land owned (2000) 0.1799 0.1386 0.0047
(0.47) (0.61) (0.00)
Change in the proportion of non agri. income * Years of schooling (labors, 2000) 0.3866* 0.0815 7.4085
(1.75) (0.41) (0.70)
Change in migration rate * Land owned (2000) 0.9659 0.1917 42.6717
(1.48) (0.38) (1.31)
Change in migration rate * Years of schooling (labors, 2000) 0.4240 0.2393 33.7187
(0.73) (0.51) (1.25)
Controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 905 905 905 905 905 905
R2 0.148 0.153 0.019 0.020 0.014 0.017
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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ing in more land, and this eﬀect seems to be larger among rel-
atively large farms. In contrast, the above eﬀect is negative if
more educated members are in the household, most likely
because those households want to allocate relatively educated
members to non-agricultural jobs. Machine investments and
services demanded also tend to increase in response to an
increase in agricultural wage (not non-agricultural wage),
and the eﬀect seems to be large among relatively large farms.
Out migration also tends to increase the demand for machine
services among relatively large farms, which directly supports
the substitution for labor by machines.
Now we report results on crop income equations. The
dependent variable is growth of crop income (crop revenues
minus all the production costs except family labor and other
family-owned inputs) in the ﬁrst diﬀerenced forms with villageﬁxed eﬀects (thus, making it unit free). We estimate the
equations with and without instruments. Based on our previ-
ous results, the identifying instruments are the interaction
terms of (i) village-level non-agricultural real wage growth,
agricultural real wage growth, change in non-agricultural
incomes, and migration rate, (ii) the initial own land or the
average years of schooling and (iii) province dummies. The
interaction of (i) and (ii) creates household-level variations
and their marginal eﬀects vary by province. Since we control
village ﬁxed eﬀects at both the ﬁrst and second stages, the
village-level variables themselves are not included in the
instruments. Essentially, the ﬁrst stage analysis utilizes the
results from Tables 2 and 5.
The results in Table 7 conﬁrm signiﬁcant eﬀects of land cul-
tivated on income but not the eﬀect of machine services. These
results remain robust whether they are estimated with instru-
42 WORLD DEVELOPMENTments or not. The estimation also separates the cultivated land
into the land owned and rented in (measured by change in net
rent-in land). As expected, both types of land signiﬁcantly con-
tribute to crop income. The interaction of self–cultivated land
(or net rent-in land) and machine services is signiﬁcantly neg-
ative without instruments. The interaction of changes in net
rent-in land and machine services is signiﬁcantly positive in
the instrumental variable estimation. Machine services seem
to be complementary with rent-in land. In the above estima-
tions, however, Hausman tests did not detect signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in estimates between non-instrument and instrumental
variable estimations.
In Columns 5–8, we restrict the sample to farmers who own
land greater than 6 mu in 2000 (relatively large farmers). In all
speciﬁcations, Hausman tests support the instrumental vari-
able estimation results, which justify us to focus on the results
with instruments. Although machine services are not signiﬁ-
cant without interactions with land, they are signiﬁcantly com-
plementary with rent-in land. The parameter is larger than the
previous estimate. 13
To sum up, the crop income equations show that (i) land,
owned and rented in, signiﬁcantly contributes to crop income
and (ii) the contribution of machines to crop income depends
on land types and sizes, and in particular, machine services seem
to augment the value of rent in land, but not own land, indicat-
ing that land is rented into enhance the eﬃciency ofmachine use.
The results aremore clearly interpretable among relatively large
farms. That is, rent in land and machine services are comple-
mentary for large farmers. This ﬁnding implies that the possibil-
ity of renting in land to expand the scale of farm operation as
well as the availability of machine services that substitute for
labor are particularly important among relatively large farms.
In other words, the advantage of large-scale farming is realized
by the increasing incidence of land renting and the increasing
availability of machine services.6. CONCLUSIONS
Using farm panel data from China, collected in six pro-
vinces, i.e., Hebei, Hubei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Sichuan and
Zhejiang, in 2000 and 2008, we examined dynamics of land
transactions, machine investments and the demand for
machine services. China’s agriculture in general experienced
an expansion of machine rentals and machine services
provided by specialized agents in the past decade, which
contributed to mechanization in agricultural production. Inparticular, we investigated the eﬀects of non-agricultural
and agricultural wage growth and changes in the proportion
of non-agricultural income and migration rate, all of which
are estimated at the village level, on changes in self-
cultivated land, rent-in land, machine investments and
machine service used. Our results show that an increase in
non-agricultural wage leads to the expansion of self-
cultivated land size, and the eﬀect tends to be larger among
larger farms. A rise in the proportion of non-agricultural
income or migration rate also signiﬁcantly increases the size
of self-cultivated land among relatively large farms.
Interestingly, our results also show that relatively educated
farm households respond to the above changes in an opposite
way, i.e., decreasing the size of self-cultivated land, which sug-
gests that land is rented out from relatively more educated to
less educated households. Since the initial land distribution is
relatively equal for historical reasons, it is schooling distribu-
tion across households that seem to play a more important
role in diﬀerentiating households: those who rent in land to
expand farm size and those who transit to non-agricultural
works and rent out land to others. This ﬁnding is in contrast
to those found in Indonesia where the initial landholding plays
an important role (Yamauchi, 2016).
The demand for machine services has also increased if agri-
cultural wage and migration rate increased over time, and the
eﬀect is larger among relatively large farms. In contrast,
machine investments were not responding to wage growth pos-
sibly because of the development of active machine rental and
service markets (Yang et al., 2013). Interestingly, the results on
crop income equations support the complementarity between
rent-in land and machine services (demanded), both of which
are mutually augmenting crop income. The possibility of rent-
ing in land to expand farm size and the availability of machine
service providers or machine rental markets are both critically
important to enhance the eﬃciency of large farms.
The above ﬁndings largely support our main hypothesis that
wage growth, now increasingly important as a result of the
successful industrialization in China, creates pressure on farm-
ers to substitute labor by machine services as well as expand
the scale of farm operations. In order to do so, the land insti-
tutions in China need to be ﬂexible enough to allow the emer-
gence of larger scale farms, which will help to maintain the
international competitiveness of Chinese agriculture. Con-
versely, if their land institutions fail to support the emergence
of larger scale farms, Chinese agriculture is likely to lose the
comparative advantage.NOTES1. China’s agriculture is dominated by smallholders with relatively small
farm size and fragmented plots. There are about 200 million small farms
that produced most of the crops in China (NBSC, 2013). When China
completed its household responsibility reform which allocated village land
equally to all households in each village in 1985, the average farm size was
only 0.7 hectare. Each household normally has at least 3–4 plots of
diﬀerent qualities and some have more than 10 plots. Around 60% of the
plots are under 0.1 ha and nearly a quarter are larger than 0.15 ha, with
the rest between 0.1 and 0.15 ha (Tan, Heerink, & Qu, 2006).
2. With the expansion of oﬀ-farm employment, some farmers are
predicted to increase their labor supply to non-agricultural sectors, and/
or rent out their land to other farmers (Bowlus & Sicular, 2003).3. Although China has codiﬁed a robust framework for the protection of
land rights such as the Land Management Law (1998), the Land
Contracting Law (2003) and the Property Law (2007), knowledge and
practical implementation of these rights still lag in rural areas. The top-
down changes to legal and political structures did not solve China’s
continued struggles with unrest resulting from the summary appropriation
of land by developers and local oﬃcials. Farmers in many areas are still
being forced to relocate by local oﬃcials, often illegally, and local cadres
still retain large amounts of money intended to be distributed to farmers as
compensation for any public-interest land seizures.
4. For the mechanical service before harvesting, for example plowing,
some of smallholders pay after harvest or selling out agricultural products.
This mode of payment is generally to the suppliers of mechanical service
WAGE GROWTH, LANDHOLDING, AND MECHANIZATION IN CHINESE AGRICULTURE 43who are local residents. However, when the suppliers of mechanical service
came from other counties or provinces, the smallholders pay cash as soon
as work is done.
5. In some regions, a quota of subsidized machine is distributed like a
lottery. Only the one who is lucky enough to get the quota is qualiﬁed to
buy the certain machines with the subsidy.
6. It should be noted that the sudden decline of the proportion of
cultivated area under mechanical plowing is because cultivated area has
been recorded to increase dramatically from 94.971 million ha in 1999 to
130.039 million ha in 2000.
7. Potentially this would lead to underestimation of rented-out land since
those who stopped farming could rent out their land to other farmers.
8. Since a small number of on-farm hired labors are reported in each
village, we expect measurement errors in the variable. We used the county-
level average if there is no hired labor case. However, we still think it is
important to include agricultural wages due to the fact that agricultural
labor demand goes up in a particular season to reﬂect the demand–supply
(im)balance, in contrast with non-agricultural wages.9. Potentially land rent-out can be under-reported if the attrition rate by
migration is high. There were 86 households that could not be interviewed
in 2008. The attrition analysis in Table 8 shows that land and labor
endowments in 2000 signiﬁcantly aﬀect the attrition probability but wage
growth (and its interactions with the household initial conditions) does
not, which conﬁrms that our main ﬁndings are not subject to attrition bias.
The land and labor endowments are controlled in the outcome equations.
10. Here we do not include input variables such as fertilize use etc. since
they are endogenous. Note that ﬁxed eﬀects such as soil quality, etc. are
diﬀerenced out.
11. Though it is essentially prohibited to sell and buy farm land, the
allocation of own land could change over time. However, a large portion
of changes in self-cultivated land comes from land rental markets.
12. This could be due to the reverse causation: In areas where cultivation
size can easily expand, people do not migrate much.
13. It is possible that rented in land is used for crops diﬀerent from the
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Dependent variable: 1 = if attrition in 2008 and 0 otherwise
Sample: Households in 2000
Real wage growth: Non ag
Real wage growth: Non ag * Land owned
Real wage growth: Non ag * Years of schooling
Real wage growth: Ag
Real wage growth: Ag * Land owned
Real wage growth: Ag * Years of schooling
Change in the proportion of non agri income
Change in the proportion of non agri. income * Land owned
Change in the proportion of non agri. income * Years of schooling
Change in migration rate
Change in migration rate * Land owned
Change in migration rate * Years of schooling
No. of plots (2000)
No. of plots2 (2000)
Land owned (2000)
Number of labors (2000)
Female (labor, 2000)
Age (labor, 2000)
Years of schooling (labor, 2000)
Net crop income at 2000 (yuan)
N
R2
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.Zhang, Y., Wang, X., Glauben, T., & Bru¨mmer, B. (2011). The impact of
land reallocation on technical eﬃciency: Evidence from China.
Agricultural Economics, 42, 495–507.APPENDIX Aon analysis
0.0384
(0.15)
0.0040
(0.26)
0.0250
(0.69)
0.0695
(0.33)
0.0051
(0.40)
0.0405
(1.42)
0.3796
(0.67)
0.0216
(0.39)
0.0638
(0.80)
1.7122
(1.41)
0.1869
(1.40)
0.0730
(0.47)
0.7440***
(12.22)
0.0604***
(10.23)
0.0596**
(2.12)
0.2231***
(3.80)
0.0341
(0.52)
0.0083
(1.42)
0.0136
(0.31)
0.0000
(0.07)
1126
0.2352
Table 9. Households with the number of out-migrants in 2008 equal to or smaller than that of 2000
Dependent variable: Self-cultivated land (mu) Net rent-in land (mu)
Real wage growth: Non ag 0.8541* 0.9624* 0.8189 0.8860
(2.11) (2.34) (1.45) (1.84)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Self-cultivated land 0.0479 0.1190 0.0098 0.0263
(0.89) (1.66) (0.18) (0.39)
Real wage growth: Non ag * Years of schooling 0.1582 0.2356*** 0.1145 0.1310*
(1.82) (4.28) (1.40) (2.55)
Real wage growth: Ag 0.5822 0.8488 0.7662 0.8734
(1.34) (1.64) (1.82) (1.42)
Real wage growth: Ag * Self-cultivated land 0.0162 0.0006 0.0078 0.0202
(0.37) (0.01) (0.18) (0.29)
Real wage growth: Ag * Years of schooling 0.1281 0.1740 0.0641 0.0596
(1.34) (1.66) (1.43) (1.33)
Change in the proportion of non agri income 2.9824** 0.2217
(2.62) (0.26)
Change in the prop of non agri income * Self-cult land 0.2097 0.0739
(1.00) (0.47)
Change in the prop of non agri income*Yrs of schooling 0.5515*** 0.1473
(5.18) (1.17)
Change in migration rate 0.0288 1.7763
(0.01) (0.76)
Change in migration rate * Self-cultivated land 0.5712 0.2484
(0.84) (0.32)
Change in migration rate * Years of schooling 0.2687 0.1395
(0.83) (0.37)
No. of plot 0.5866* 0.5977* 0.7341*** 0.7395***
(2.09) (2.11) (4.20) (4.21)
No. of plot2 0.0653* 0.0622* 0.0654** 0.0663**
(2.16) (2.02) (3.32) (3.25)
Land owned (2000) 0.2656* 0.4522* 0.0019 0.0599
(2.13) (2.49) (0.02) (0.38)
Number of labors (2000) 0.3167 0.3087 0.0561 0.0514
(0.95) (0.94) (0.27) (0.24)
Female (labor, 2000) 0.1397 0.1888 0.0312 0.0359
(0.48) (0.72) (0.14) (0.17)
Age (labor, 2000) 0.0433** 0.0384** 0.0012 0.0017
(3.27) (3.32) (0.09) (0.13)
Years of schooling (labor, 2000) 0.0782 0.2374 0.1256 0.1504**
(0.76) (1.82) (1.94) (2.81)
Net crop income (yuan, 2000) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.05) (1.26) (0.32) (0.39)
Constant 3.4603** 3.4249** 0.8544 0.5248
(2.96) (2.72) (0.62) (0.32)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 720 720 720 720
R2 0.116 0.139 0.057 0.060
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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